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Abstract: Nothing was more important for W. E. B. Du Bois than to promote 
the upward mobility of African Americans. This essay revisits his “Conversation 
of Races” to demonstrate its general philosophical importance. Ultimately, 
Du Bois’s three motivations for giving the address reveal his view of the nature of 
philosophical inquiry: to critique earlier phenotypic conceptions of race, to show 
the essentiality of history, and to promote a reflexive practice. Commentators have 
been unduly invested in the hermeneutic readings and as a result have misunder-
stood its philosophical dimensions. Du Bois did more than introduce the concept 
of race into the purview of philosophy, he provided a method for philosophical 
inquiry into a concept that is notoriously difficult to approach with precision. 
The goal here is to show why no introduction to philosophy and no discussion 
about the nature of philosophical inquiry is complete without consideration of 
“Conservation.” Certainly, it is a text about race, but it is also an important philo-
sophical text in general.
Keywords: Du Bois, race, metaphilosophy.
1
At first glance, “The Conservation of Races” (hereafter “Conservation”) 
seems simply an address that William Edward Burghardt Du Bois de-
livered at the inaugural meeting of the American Negro Academy, an 
event that took place in 1897. More than a short speech, however, it is a 
metaphilosophical text that announces a set of intentions illuminating the 
nature of philosophical inquiry. (The text was later published in the sec-
ond volume of the occasional papers of the American Negro Academy.) 
Du Bois opens the address by explaining why the meaning of race is so 
important to African Americans. They have long been considered to be 
the inferior race. African Americans have erroneously been led to under-
value racial differences, to believe that “from one blood God created all 
nations,” and to discuss “human brotherhood” as though it has already 
been realized (Du Bois 2000, 108). Before Du Bois exposes the inade-
quacy of phenotypic conceptions of race, he promulgates his main reason 
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for inquiring into the meaning of race: to uplift African Americans. 
On the one hand, he has been attacked for expounding a conception of 
race that relies on circular logic and ultimately uses the same types of 
biological notions he ardently criticized in the work of his interlocutors. 
Indeed, this is how Kwame Anthony Appiah presents Du Bois in “The 
Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race” (1985) and 
“The Conservation of ‘Race’” (1989). On the other hand, Du Bois has 
been praised for making lived experience pertinent to thinking about the 
meaning of race. Lucius Outlaw defends Du Bois this way in “Against 
the Grain of Modernity: The Politics of Difference and the Conservation 
of ‘Race’” (1992), “On W. E. B. Du Bois’s ‘The Conservation of Races,’” 
(1995), and “‘Conserve’ Races? In Defense of W. E. B. Du Bois” (1996a). 
But “Conservation” escapes facile characterizations. It calls listeners (and 
readers) to go beyond simple dismissals or easy commendations as it in-
vites them to ponder the question of human alterity.
I argue that when Du Bois advances his conception of race and 
announces his intentions, he implicitly introduces three metaphilosophical 
theses that run throughout “Conservation,” namely, critique as general 
practice is philosophy, philosophy cannot be done without attention to 
history, and ultimately the goal of philosophy is transformation. This is 
quite different from anything his interlocutors had undertaken. The search 
for scientific explanations of race focused on the differing appearance of 
human beings coupled with anxiety about miscegenation. The response 
from black thinkers centered on racial equality and social justice, with the 
tendency to minimize racial alterity. Du Bois manages to overcome both 
tendencies and introduce a different conception of race by revealing its 
real meaning, rather than how it functions. I demonstrate these metaphil-
osophical theses by turning to his three intentions for giving the address. 
They reveal a great deal about his view of the nature of philosophical 
inquiry: to critique earlier phenotypic conceptions of race, to show the 
essentiality of history, and to promote a reflexive practice. Commentators 
have been unduly invested in how to properly interpret minute aspects of 
the text and as a result have misunderstood it as a whole. Du Bois pro-
vided a method for philosophical inquiry into the concept of race that is 
notoriously difficult to approach with precision. My goal here is to show 
why no introduction to philosophy or discussion of the nature of phil-
osophical inquiry is complete without consideration of “Conservation.” 
Certainly, it is a text about race, but it is also an important philosophical 
text in general.
2
Like most historical figures in the Africana philosophical tradition, 
Du Bois has an ambivalent relationship to the discipline of philosophy. He 
was not formally trained in philosophy, although he studied the subject 
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with William James, George Santayana, and Francis Greenwood Peabody. 
Instead, Du Bois received a bachelor’s degree in history from Harvard 
University after studying classics at Fisk University. Most of his work cen-
ters on the idea of race, which for a long time was not considered a proper 
topic of philosophical inquiry. The debate as to his status as a philosopher 
or nonphilosopher (that is, a historian, sociologist, or theorist) is imma-
terial to my argument. His direct concern with philosophy interests me. 
The term philosophy appears a total of four times in “Conservation,” the 
most important of which states: “It is necessary, therefore, in planning our 
movements, in guiding our future development, that at times we rise above 
the pressing, but smaller questions of separate schools and cars, wage- 
discrimination and lynch law, to survey the whole question of race in human 
philosophy and to lay, on a basis of broad knowledge and careful insight, 
those large lines of policy and higher ideals which may form our guiding 
lines and boundaries in the practical difficulties of every day” (2000, 108; 
emphasis added). Du Bois does not deny the importance of combating 
racial inequality, but he reprioritizes it. He explains the necessity of first 
asking the metaphysical question about race and then allowing the social 
and the political to follow. In addition to his claim that philosophy was a 
German achievement, the term philosophy also appears to describe par-
ticular philosophies: “[the] individualistic philosophy of the Declaration 
of Independence and the laisser-faire philosophy of Adam Smith” (2000, 
110). The philosophical movement committed to individualism is liberal-
ism. It is not entirely apparent why Du Bois mentions Smith of all people 
by name. Smith’s philosophy is in opposition to the unity and directional-
ity Du Bois thinks nations need to make progress.
In 1956 Du Bois explained to Herbert Aptheker the role that study-
ing philosophy had in his formative intellectual years: “For two years I 
studied under William James while he was developing Pragmatism; under 
[George] Santayana and his attractive mysticism and under [Josiah] Royce 
and his Hegelian idealism. I then found and adopted a philosophy which 
has served me since; thereafter I turned to the study of History and what 
has become Sociology” (1973, 394; emphasis added). Commentators have 
interpreted this passage two ways. The first is decidedly negative, reading 
this as Du Bois turning away from mysticism and idealism to study history 
and sociology (Curry 2004, 391). The second is positive, reading this as 
a claim that mysticism and idealism paved the way for his study of his-
tory and sociology (Shaw 2013, 3–4). For my purposes, this passage sim-
ply demonstrates that Du Bois was invested in philosophical discourses. 
The only thing clear about this passage is that his study of history and 
sociology corresponds to his study of mysticism and idealism. Before he 
studied history and sociology, he studied mysticism and idealism. I am 
not attempting to demonstrate his philosophical bona fides by showing 
his connection to European philosophical movements. I concur that many 
figures and movements of thought left an impression on Du Bois, but 
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there is no advantage in calling him a “Hegelian” (Williamson 1978, 21). 
This essay endeavors to demonstrate how “Conservation” is an indepen-
dent work of metaphilosophy by relying on claims in the text.
The German influence on Du Bois greatly affected his view of philosophy. 
According to Du Bois, science and philosophy were the historical achieve-
ments of the German nation (2000, 112). On a personal level, his exposure 
to German culture, art, literature, language, and music left an enormous 
impression on him. Throughout his life, he continued to be a great admirer 
of German music and art. References to the German Romanticism of 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Friedrich Schiller are frequently found in 
his work. On an intellectual level, he studied with the historian Heinrich von 
Treitschke and the political economist Gustav von Schmoller at the Friedrich 
Wilhelm University in Berlin (Beck 1996, 46). Treitschke impressed upon Du 
Bois the importance of national unity with his defense of Pan-Germanism, 
while Schmoller impressed upon him the ideas of German historiography. 
But the intellectual commitments of Du Bois in “Conservation” mark only a 
moment in a long and varied intellectual biography. No one influenced him 
more than the men of the American Negro Academy. Alexander Crummell, 
John Wesley Cromwell, Paul Laurence Dunbar, and Kelly Miller were the 
audience for “Conservation.”
It is no secret that Du Bois had a deep admiration for Crummell. He 
devotes an entire chapter to Crummell in The Souls of Black Folk (2007b 
[1903]) (hereafter Souls). But what separates Du Bois from his contempo-
raries in the Africana philosophical tradition is that he, unlike Frederick 
Douglass, does not take racial assimilation as a viable path for progress. 
Unlike Booker T. Washington, he does not take the accumulation of 
wealth as an appropriate path to freedom, and unlike Crummell, he does 
not take human reason and the capacity for moral agency as the basis for 
demonstrating that slavery is evil. He recognizes that where race is con-
cerned, everything we thought to be true must be called into question. 
This methodic questioning is the vocation of a philosopher. It is not to our 
advantage as readers to simply place Du Bois in opposition to Douglass 
and Washington or refer to him as the protégé of Crummell. These men 
are his interlocutors. To understand the young Du Bois as a philosopher, 
then, we must consider the ideas of these men. He is uniquely celebrated 
not just for the beauty of his prose but also for the depth and breadth of 
his study of the plight of black people. His ideas have been marginalized in 
the discipline of philosophy; more often than not, they have been relegated 
to other disciplines, such as sociology, history, or literary studies. Today, 
Du Bois has achieved a coveted position in the critical philosophy of race, 
which should be credited to Appiah’s early commentary, though Appiah 
initially “ushers Du Bois into the light mainly to make visible what appear 
to him to be blemishes” (Taylor 2000, 103). The address by Du Bois has 
more philosophical relevance than shown by previous interpretations, 
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which treat his characterization of race as a “primarily descriptive” crite-
rion (Gray 2013, 466).
No other historical text by a black thinker has been commented on 
more by philosophers than “Conservation,” a fact readily established by a 
glance at the considerable volume of secondary literature. It is a founda-
tional text in Africana philosophy, critical philosophy of race, and social 
and political philosophy. Yet, as I am insisting here, we should include it in 
metaphilosophy as well. There is still more to be said about the text, just 
as scholars of ancient Greek philosophy are still commenting on Plato’s 
Apology. It is common to think of Du Bois as one of the pioneering think-
ers to contribute to our philosophical understanding of race and racism 
because he treats both as philosophical inquiries. But he contributes to 
our understanding of the nature of philosophy itself  not just by helping 
us to see that the concept of race is within the proper scope and aim of 
philosophical inquiry but also by shaping our understanding of the ulti-
mate purpose of philosophy, which is to transform the world we live in 
by changing the lives of people or to conceive “ideals for life” (Du Bois 
2000, 111). “Conservation” has a larger impact. It calls us to reflect on the 
structures and processes involved in how we come to have knowledge of 
ourselves and the world we live in.
3
The address has a six-part structure: an introduction, a section discussing 
the phenotypic conception of race, a section establishing the sociohistor-
ical conception of race, a section reflecting on the special predicament of 
African Americans, a section defending the necessity to conserve race, and 
a credo for the American Negro Academy. This six-part structure supports 
my view that Du Bois had three main intentions in the address. The first 
intention (to critique phenotypic conceptions of race) can be found in the 
introduction and the section about the scientific conception of race. The 
second intention (to demonstrate the essentiality of history) is apparent in 
nearly each part of the address but is central to the section that establishes 
the sociohistorical conception of race. The third motivation (to promote a 
reflexive practice for the improvement of African American life) of course 
frames the text but primarily occupies the sections on the special predica-
ment of African Americans, defense of the necessity to conserve race, and 
the credo. In my analysis, the introduction of the address foreshadows 
the entire address with this set of intentions. The address has a tone of 
urgency because Du Bois is concerned about future of the Negro race, for 
which he feels personally responsible.
There are two overlapping senses in which Du Bois offers a critique, 
neither of which invokes the Kantian understanding of the term by which 
philosophy begins after critical reflection. Critical reflection is philosophy 
for Du Bois. The first sense is a critique of a position. Du Bois critiques 
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phenotypic conceptions of race. The sense of critique has a discourse in 
mind, specific opponents, and a clear objection. It has constrained goals. 
The second sense is critique as a general practice. Du Bois asks us to pon-
der the true meaning of race. It is difficult to completely separate the two 
senses of critique because critique is always a critique of a discourse, and 
even the general practice of critique is going to have a discourse in mind at 
some point. Critique as a general practice, however, always invokes philos-
ophy because it is broad and invokes a methodic questioning. Within the 
Kantian understanding of critique, there is a sense in which critical reflec-
tion is distinct from philosophy in that it is prior to it. Thus, when Du Bois 
claims that it is difficult to arrive at “any definite conclusion” concerning 
the “the essential difference of races” (2000, 109), is he not broaching the 
philosophical and inviting his listeners (and readers) to remain critical 
of any discourse that claims to provide with confidence an answer to the 
question of human alterity?
A Critique of Phenotypic Conceptions of Race
The truth is that Du Bois just intends to produce a better conception of 
race than his interlocutors, one that accounts for the precarious experience 
of African Americans. He opposes the earlier phenotypic conceptions 
of race that propose “color, hair, cranial measurements and language” 
are the essential difference between human beings (Du Bois 2000, 109). 
He names Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, Thomas Henry Huxley, and 
Friedrich Ratzel as some of his opponents. (Du Bois adopts the “Raetzel” 
spelling. It is unclear if  it was a typo or not.) There are three phenotypic 
conceptions of race that Du Bois opposes: natural, cultural, and ideolog-
ical. Most commentators have failed to notice these subtle yet important 
distinctions, and as a result they have focused on what is often referred to 
as Du Bois’s opposition to the scientific conception, following Appiah’s 
early commentary. When Du Bois refers to science, he is referring sim-
ply to Enlightenment-era anthropological discussions rather than to the 
hard science of biology as we know it today (that is, the science that has 
dispelled the biological reality of race). In any event, Du Bois opposes 
Blumenbach and Huxley for their natural conceptions of race and Ratzel 
for his cultural conception of race. Du Bois also combats natural law con-
ceptions of race. The geographical displacement of African Americans 
(a history of forced migration and enslavement) demands for Du Bois a 
different conception of race, one that accounts for why African Americans 
appear phenotypically African but, for example, have differences due to 
their geographical displacement. More important, he delineates what is so 
deeply problematic about phenotypic conceptions of race: their superfici-
ality, outright racial chauvinism, and antiblack racism.
Du Bois opposes Blumenbach as the main proponent of the natu-
ral, phenotypic conception of race. Blumenbach plays a large role in the 
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invention of the scientific conception of race with the claim that human-
kind has natural varieties. It would have been difficult for Du Bois to 
ignore Blumenbach, who is a central figure in nineteenth-century dis-
cussions about the science of race (Hooker 2017, 5–11). Blumenbach 
repudiates Albrecht von Haller’s preformationism, which introduced the 
notion of a formative drive (Bernasconi 2006, 75). Blumenbach expands 
on the work of Carl Linnaeus with his classification of human varieties 
in “On the Natural Variety of Mankind” (2000 [1775]). Linnaeus created 
the modern system of naming and classifying organisms. Blumenbach is 
one of the first to attempt to apply this classification approach to human 
beings. In his doctoral dissertation, he argues there are four human vari-
eties, classified by geographical location: people from Europe, including 
North India, North Africa, and North America; people from Asia; people 
from Africa; and people from North America. He gradually modifies his 
position as more information becomes available through travel writings 
about other lands. In 1781 he expands the four human varieties to five 
but maintains geographical location as the basis for differentiation: people 
from Europe (primeval), including North India, North Africa, and North 
America (for example, Esquimaux); people from the rest of Asia beyond 
the Ganges River; people from Africa (except North Africa); people from 
the rest of America; and people from the Southern World (such as the 
Philippines). Accordingly, he argues that there are five human varieties 
classified by phenotype. Today, he is known for his five-race taxonomy: 
Caucasians, Mongolians, Ethiopians, Americans, and Malays. He took 
variations in appearance and cranial measurements and shape to be not 
only related to geography and climate but also indicative of racial differ-
ences. Other physical characteristics such as skin color also determine how 
he derives his final five human varieties. For Du Bois, the main issue with 
Blumenbach’s “five-race schema” (2000, 109) is that it follows the logic 
that human alterity is purely a physical matter.
Du Bois opposes Huxley too as a proponent of the phenotypic con-
ception of race. Huxley is one of the first to attempt to explicitly apply 
Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution to race, despite being one of the 
theory’s initial agnostics. After becoming an adherent of the theory, he 
argues in “On the Geographical Distribution of the Chief Modifications 
of Mankind” (1870) that there are four types of human modifications. His 
use of the term modification indicates that he adopts monogenism, apply-
ing the idea that proto-racial types become more evolved or modified and 
that geographical distribution is indicative of racial differences. His modi-
fications are the Australoid type, the Negroid type, the Xanthochroic type, 
and the Mongoloid type (1870, 404). Huxley describes the Australoid 
type, or Australians, as people with a “fair stature,” “well-developed torso 
and arms,” and “dolichocephalic” (meaning their measurements were 
seventy-five to seventy-six on the cranial index) (404). He elaborates on 
the physical characteristics common to each type and its corresponding 
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geographical location. For example, the Negroid type generally has skin 
that is “various shades of brown to what is commonly called black” and 
belongs to “South Africa (including Madagascar) between the Sahara 
and what may be roughly called the region of the Cape” (404). With the 
dominant narrative about the origin of the human race being the “out of 
Africa” narrative, the Negroid type becomes the least evolved type. The 
tone of these proto-racial classification theories is decidedly negative, and, 
again, Du Bois takes issue with the idea that human alterity becomes a 
completely physical matter. According to Du Bois, the most important 
lesson we learned from Darwin is that there is more phenotypic diversity 
among members of the same race group than there is between the race 
groups themselves.
There are other opponents Du Bois has in mind. Ratzel, for one, pres-
ents a cultural, phenotypic conception of race and, like Huxley, follows 
Blumenbach’s lead in presenting racial schema based on physical charac-
teristics. Ratzel thus conceives of humans as organizing themselves into 
societies in response to their environments (Hunter 1983, 80). The greatest 
limitation of Darwin’s natural selection thesis, for Ratzel, is that Darwin 
has no explanation for understanding how humans react to and utilize 
their surroundings. Thus, Ratzel develops his own framework. In The 
History of Mankind (1896–98), he comes to frame this discussion using 
the concept of lebensraum (living space), later used as a political term by 
twentieth-century German Nationalists. Ratzel refers to what he calls “cul-
tured races” (1896–98, 1:14) and the continents they belong to. Following 
the same tendency to rely on geographical location as an indicator for 
racial identity, he derives four race groups: the American-Pacific Group 
of Races, Light Stocks of South and Central Africa, the Negro Races, and 
the Cultured Races of the Old World. These four race groups are based 
on geographical locations and the determining factor of culture. Ratzel 
then dissects these four groups into subraces. The Negro races include the 
Waganda and other races that formed states near the Nile, the Negroes 
of the upper and middle Nile, and the races of the interior of Africa. For 
Ratzel, the cultural development of a state is inseparable from its spatial 
growth. If  Du Bois had invoked any understanding of culture, it would 
have not aligned with the one Ratzel adopts. We must be careful to dis-
tinguish their understandings of culture if  we are to be persuaded by the 
idea that Du Bois presents “a cultural theory of race” (Jeffers 2013, 408).
Du Bois resists the idea that race can be explained with universal prin-
ciples such as the ones found in natural law theory. This aspect of his 
critique has been completely ignored by commentators. Natural law the-
ory might simply be called the theory of universal law. In this regard, Du 
Bois has no explicit concern about ethical or normative theory, with which 
natural law theory is generally associated. Across his works, he appeals 
to God, spirit, and souls. For our purposes here, the relationship between 
natural law and universal principles is more important than the debate as 
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to whether we should consider Du Bois a secular thinker or a religious nat-
uralist (Lloyd 2016, 58–87). When we take a closer look, there are several 
references to natural law in “Conservation.” Historical progression is Du 
Bois’s universal principle, which I take up in the next section of this essay. 
This is Du Bois’s critique of ideological, phenotypic conceptions of race. 
By ideological, I mean that the idea of race is based on phenotype and that 
inferiority and superiority are attached to people based on their appear-
ance—for example, the idea that people with dark skin are the result of 
the biblical curse of Ham. Du Bois intended to combat the universality of 
skin color etiologies in “Conservation.” Such universal laws do not neatly 
fit the natural or cultural phenotypic conceptions I have just described; 
rather, they fit the category of ideology. Ultimately, natural law theory 
has limitations for Du Bois because it is deterministic. Due to human abil-
ity to strive and overcome hardship, race and destiny are not static but 
transcendental.
The Essentiality of History
Du Bois presents a philosophy of history with his race concept by making 
it central to the meaning and directionality of history—“one far off  Divine 
event” (2000, 111). He regards history as an intelligible process moving to-
ward human freedom. Even more, he views the state of human freedom 
as one of racial equality. History, for Du Bois, is a concept that requires 
a critical approach. We might call it a critique of the concept of history. 
The term history appears approximately twenty times in “Conservation.” 
On occasion Du Bois even capitalizes the term. Its importance is undeni-
able. For many commentators, the most important acknowledgement of 
history by Du Bois appears in his definition of race: “If  this be true, then 
the history of the world is the history, not of individuals, but of groups, not of 
nations, but of races, and he who ignores or seeks to override the race idea 
in human history ignores and overrides the central thought of all history. 
What, then, is a race? It is a vast family of human beings, generally of 
common blood and language, always of common history, traditions and 
impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for 
the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of 
life” (2000, 110; emphasis added). I think, however, we must look at the 
broader significance of history in the address. Du Bois presents a philos-
ophy of history as he is concerned with the theoretical foundation of the 
practice and social consequences of race. The historical context of the ad-
dress is very important (Bernasconi 2009, 519). Du Bois utilizes universal 
understanding of world history. He indicates his agreement with the idea 
that there is a coherent and unified view of history that will tell a progres-
sive story about humankind. Human progress has slowly but surely distin-
guished people. National identity and, therefore, racial groups contribute 
to history through their striving.
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Du Bois claims that there are eight major races: “the Slavs of east-
ern Europe, the Teutons of middle Europe, the English of Great Britain 
and America, the Romance nations of Southern and Western Europe, the 
Negroes of Africa and America, the Semitic people of Western Asia and 
Northern Africa, the Hindoos of Central Asia and the Mongolians of 
Eastern Asia” (2000, 110). He also mentions that there are smaller groups 
within the races, thereby denying racial homogeneity. For example, the 
Slavs of Eastern Europe include “the Czech, the Magyar, the Pole and the 
Russian” (110). Du Bois does not always present the same list of world 
races; he presents at least three different accounts. The first, which I have 
just outlined, is in this address. The second appears in Souls: “After the 
Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, 
the Negro is a sort of seventh son” (2007b, 8). Here Du Bois’s language is 
almost identical to the language of the world races G. W. F. Hegel uses in his 
philosophy of world history, since he treats the Egyptians independently 
from the Negro race (Pope 2006, 183). The third appears in Dusk of Dawn: 
An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept (2007a [1963]) (here-
after Dusk). There Du Bois emphasizes the sacredness of Africa, indicat-
ing the importance of geography, but his terminology changes, especially 
in the case of the Asiatic races. For instance, he names the Chinese and 
Indians as separate races (2007a, 49–50). This is not mere inconsistency 
on his part, since he never took the world races to be static. In describing 
what distinguishes these races from each other, he admits that phenotypic 
differences are relevant but superficial. The deeper differences between 
races concern their common histories, common laws, religion, habits, and 
common striving toward a goal or ideal. Historical progress brings about 
racial distinctions. In other words, race is a becoming.
By emphasizing the importance of history, I do not mean to undermine 
the sociological aspect of Du Bois’s sociohistorical conception of race, 
which is essential for understanding the definition Du Bois puts forth and 
is indispensable for understanding why he decides to conduct empirical 
research on African Americans. I merely emphasize that the historical 
aspect of his conception of race is foundational to grasping what race is, 
or its essence is, whereas the sociological aspects concern how it functions 
in society. Du Bois analyzes social factors to demonstrate how race man-
ifests. The two are intertwined, yet his interest in the notion of universal 
world history indicates more than a mere interest in the philosophy of 
history; instead it represents a robust historicism that guides his concep-
tion of race (Appiah 2014, 120). Historicism is the view that phenomena 
are determined by history and that historical development structures all 
human experience. The sociological aspect of Du Bois’s conception of 
race is covered briefly in “Conservation” and even more briefly in Souls; it 
is his works such as The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study (2014b [1899]) 
and Black Reconstruction in America (2014a [1935]) that explicitly cover 
the sociological aspect of race.
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Du Bois supports the idea that race is a becoming, with his notion of 
double consciousness. He demonstrates to us why asking the question 
about human essence for African Americans is unavoidable due to experi-
ence. Each African American confronts the perils of being both American 
and a Negro. He then asks a series of questions that foreshadow his notion 
of double consciousness: “What, after all, am I? Am I an American or 
am I a Negro? Can I be both? Or is it my duty to cease to be a Negro as 
soon as possible and be an American? If  I strive as a Negro, am I not 
perpetuating the very cleft that threatens and separates Black and White 
America? Is it not my only possible practical aim the subduction of all 
that is Negro in me to the American? Does my black blood place upon 
me anymore obligation to assert my nationality than German, or Irish 
or Italian blood would?” (2000, 113; emphasis added). Du Bois does not 
answer these questions. In a manner philosophers commonly refer to as 
the Socratic method, he asks these questions to stimulate critical thinking 
and to draw out ideas and underlying presuppositions about the mean-
ing of race. His series of questions represent an existential crisis, self- 
questioning, and a deep hesitation (Gordon 2000a, 62–95). Du Bois 
manages to describe a life decorated with vacillation and contradiction. If  
one is to have a understanding of the real meaning of race, then one must 
consider the role of experience.
Du Bois’s notion of double consciousness refers to three different, but 
not independent, issues. The first is about the power of stereotypes about 
black people, especially their capacities. The second is about the racism 
that first divided whites and blacks but also excluded African Americans 
from mainstream American society and limited their ability to participate 
in the national culture. This division has several iterations, but the most 
obvious examples are housing and educational segregation and, of course, 
Jim Crow laws. The third issue might simply be called the psychological 
issue. The double experience of being both American and not American 
is what Du Bois refers to as an internal conflict: the African American 
individual struggles between the poles of what is African and what is 
American. For Du Bois, the essence of a distinctive African consciousness 
is its spirituality, a spirituality based, geographically speaking, in Africa 
but revealed among African Americans in their folklore, which captures 
the history of their suffering, forced migration, and faith. In this sense, 
double consciousness concerns Du Bois’s efforts to privilege the spirit over 
material. The notion of double consciousness precedes Du Bois: a notable 
example is Goethe’s use of the idea in Faust, but Du Bois makes distinctive 
use of it with his conception of race. Double consciousness is an existen-
tial explanation of the affliction that the African American endures.
While his notion of double consciousness does much of the work for 
him in capturing relativism, Du Bois refines his conception of race by 
explaining it in terms of his own life. This approach magnifies the sub-
tleties of his conception. Unlike his previous conceptual attempts to 
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explicate the sociohistorical conception of race, the autobiographical 
register demonstrates the complexity and multidimensionality of race. 
Du Bois would come to define his sociohistorical concept of race by 
explaining it in terms of the human life he knew best: his own. Yet he 
inverts his own approach to race: whereas he was once committed to the-
oretical conceptions of race, here he commits himself  to elaborating upon 
that conception of race through a first-person account. Moreover, he elab-
orates on the context in which his thoughts on race developed. He claims 
that his education was responsible for how he thought about race. In Dusk, 
he reflects on four phases of his education and the general attitude about 
race that characterized them: geography, lack of conversation about race, 
dogmatic discussions about race, and the cultural and historical focus on 
race (2007a, 49–67). In the first phase, geographical distinctions are used to 
explain racial differences. In the second phase, explicit discussions of race 
are avoided, but racial tension is in the background and structures social 
interactions. In the third phase, race is openly discussed but is described 
only as a problem. In the final phase, at Harvard University, the cultural 
and cultural history aspects of race are emphasized. This marks another 
reason we must be specific about Du Bois’s use of culture. This admission 
demonstrates that Du Bois is indeed mixing approaches to his concept of 
race and fighting several false tendencies in previous definitions of race. 
Beyond this epistemological goal, his admission supports the idea that he 
adopts a historical framing even in his reflections on how he came to pro-
pose a concept of race in the early period of his life.
Reflexive Practice
Du Bois promotes a reflexive practice. We must not ignore to whom 
Du Bois delivered this address. He addressed the American Negro 
Academy, which was founded by Crummell. This organization of black 
intellectuals was dedicated to the promotion of higher education, arts, 
and science for African Americans as part of the overall struggle for 
racial equality. The American Negro Academy is the society of black men 
who made up the talented tenth, which Du Bois articulated soon after 
publishing “Conservation,” which has been criticized for his “masculinist 
worldview” and upholding of respectability politics (James 1997, 35). An 
all-male organization, the American Negro Academy consisted of men 
with backgrounds in law, medicine, literature, religion, and community 
activism. Their collective goals were to lead and protect black people 
and to be shining examples of well-educated and capable black men—a 
destructive weapon to secure equality and destroy racism. The organiza-
tion was formed to promote classical higher education for blacks, counter 
to Booker T. Washington’s insistence on vocational training. Accordingly, 
the final intention of Du Bois in his address is to provide a plan of 
action for the improvement of African American life. No doubt this is the 
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impression that studying pragmatism left on him (Taylor 2004, 99). Du 
Bois’s credo names seven policies, which outline a reflexive practice.
Du Bois was interested in human action as a sociologist, and he bor-
rowed from pragmatism. There are two reasons for sociological inquiry: 
the immediate and mediate aims of any scientific inquiry and the aims 
of science and the utility of scientific results. The immediate aim of 
science is knowledge. Though Du Bois critiques the phenotypic con-
ception of race and offers the sociohistorical conception of race as an 
improvement, he is still deeply concerned about science, as we need to 
gain broad knowledge about race. The mediate aims may vary, but social 
reform is the one upon which Du Bois focused throughout his career, 
and it begins in “Conservation.” Recall, his most significant mention of 
the term philosophy is “to survey the whole question of race in human 
philosophy and to lay . . . [it] on a basis of broad knowledge and care-
ful insight,” and his mediate aim is to consider “those large lines of pol-
icy and higher ideals which may form our guiding lines and boundaries in 
the practical difficulties of every day” (2000, 108; emphasis in Du Bois). 
Lewis R. Gordon calls this Du Bois’s “humanistic philosophy,” which con-
cerns all human sciences (2000b, 265). Robert Gooding-Williams calls this 
Du Bois’s interest in scientific knowledge. Du Bois sketches three distinct 
answers to the question of sociological inquiry, each of which corresponds 
to a different conception of the object of social scientific knowledge: 
knowledge of social laws, knowledge of the scope and limits, and knowl-
edge of moral facts (Gooding-Williams 2017). Much of this initial work 
appears in “Conservation,” although commentators have mainly focused 
on Du Bois’s later work to make these claims. Philosophical inquiry 
aims at scientific knowledge, and his training as a sociologist only serves 
Du Bois well in his endeavors.
Du Bois’s credo outlines the reflexive actions African Americans should 
take to uplift themselves. By reflexive, I mean that they adopt a relational 
view of themselves—myself/themselves (the race)—and that this relational 
view subconsciously guides their habitus. The seven policies Du Bois out-
lines are controversial. For the sake of clarity, I will discuss each policy in 
turn. The first—“We believe that the Negro people, as a race, have a con-
tribution to make to civilization and humanity, which no other race can 
make” (2000, 116)—is supported throughout the text but is most appar-
ent in the opening lines, where Du Bois discusses the feeling that African 
Americans must minimize their racial identity. He suggests that this feel-
ing has been brought on by outside influences who think negatively about 
black people. The title of the address also clearly indicates that he advised 
a policy that insists on the necessity of conservation of race. Hence, there is 
an obligation for African Americans to maintain their racial identity until 
the “mission of the Negro people is accomplished, and the ideal of human 
brotherhood has become a practical possibility” (117). The larger goal 
in which the Negro must be included is the advancement of modernity. 
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Du Bois was “rewriting of the historiography of his day” (Miles 2003, 20). 
This advancement is striving (German streben). At the end of his credo he 
says, “[O]nly earnest efforts on the part of the white people of this country 
will bring much needed reform in these matters” (117). With this, African 
Americans must resolve “to strive in every honorable way for the realiza-
tion of the best and highest aims, for the development of strong manhood 
and pure womanhood, and for the rearing of a race ideal in America and 
Africa, to the glory of God and the uplifting of the Negro people” (117). 
Although the last policy indicates that striving is a practice itself, the other 
policies explain the necessity of this reflexive practice.
Du Bois announces four beliefs that he adopts and encourages other 
African Americans to adopt. He first asks the men in the room to endorse 
a belief  in future racial harmony. He writes, “[U]nless modern civilization 
is a failure, it is entirely feasible and practicable for two races in such essen-
tial political, economic and religious harmony as the white and colored 
people of America, to develop side by side in peace and mutual happiness, 
the peculiar contribution which each has to make to the culture of their 
common country” (2000, 116; emphasis added). Similarly, the second belief  
Du Bois asks African Americans to adopt is the faith that the tension 
between whites and blacks be resolved. He suggests “a social equilibrium 
as would, throughout all the complicated relations of life, give due and 
just consideration to culture, ability, and moral worth, whether they be 
found under white or black skins” (117). The third belief  he asks African 
Americans to adopt is about the hope that racial friction will subside as a 
result of their own action and practice. He writes, “[T]he first and great-
est step toward the settlement of the present friction between the races— 
commonly called the Negro Problem—lies in the correction of the 
immorality, crime and laziness among the Negroes themselves, which 
still remains as a heritage from slavery” (117). The fourth belief  he asks 
African Americans to adopt is a universalism concerning “economic and 
intellectual” ability (117)—that is, racial identity does not indicate eco-
nomic or intellectual abilities.
Again, Du Bois’s main reason for inquiring into the meaning of 
race was to uplift African Americans, specifically the American Negro 
Academy men in the room that day. These men had already overcome 
significant hardships to receive their educations and had become pillars 
in the black community. Cromwell was a lawyer who was born into slav-
ery on September 5, 1846, in Portsmouth, Virginia, and had received his 
law degree from Howard University School of Law. He helped form the 
Virginia Educational and Historical Association and the National Colored 
Press Association, which later became the National Afro-American Press 
Association. Dunbar was a gifted poet and a godfather of the Harlem 
Renaissance. During his years at Central High School in Dayton, Ohio, 
he was the school’s only student of color, but it was his academic perfor-
mance that truly distinguished him. He served as editor in chief  of the 
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school paper and president of the literary society. (His mother, a former 
slave, had taught him to read.) Miller was a mathematician and was admit-
ted to the graduate program in Johns Hopkins University’s Department of 
Mathematics in 1887. After two years, however, he withdrew from the uni-
versity. In 1889 he reenrolled in a graduate program, this time at Howard 
University, earned a doctorate degree in mathematics, and was appointed 
professor there in 1890. These are the people whom Du Bois was address-
ing. And yet, in an attempt to arrive at the correct interpretation of the 
address, philosophers have overlooked this important aspect.
4
Many have paid little attention to the setting of the address, Du Bois’s 
motivations for giving the address, and the literary devices Du Bois uses 
in the address. Instead, they have been concerned only with the explicit 
arguments in the text, determined to identify what his answer to their own 
questions might have been and to attach his words to a definitive theory. 
This is not the optimal way to read this text. It is best read as a text about 
the nature of philosophical inquiry. His philosophical concerns are clearly 
directed toward life; Du Bois examines the question of human nature in 
terms of his own life, to transform it, to exhort the men of the American 
Negro Academy to examine and transform their lives, and to uplift their 
race. Despite this aim, he has often been presented as being concerned 
primarily with the search for a definition of race. This portrait owes much 
to Appiah who, in his early essays, presents Du Bois as a thinker who 
commits an unthinkable argumentative fallacy. A fallacy that no good phi-
losopher would ever have committed. Du Bois has also been presented as 
being concerned with the lived experience of African Americans. This por-
trait owes much to Outlaw, who, in his defense of Du Bois against Appiah, 
manages to distill Du Bois’s address down to only its concreteness rather 
than its general philosophical import.
Three aspects of the specific conception of philosophical inquiry that 
we experience in “Conservation” are now apparent. As Du Bois attempts 
to provide a better conception of race, it requires him to give an account 
of how earlier conceptions are limited—philosophy as critique. As he 
defends the essentiality of history for the real meaning of race, we expe-
rience the overwhelming feeling that philosophy cannot and should not 
be done without attention to history—historicism. The most compelling 
aspect of this address is that it exhorts a reflexive practice—philosophy 
as praxis. For Du Bois, philosophical inquiry is one in which his thought 
and life are completely united, such that they cannot be separated from 
each other. Much though he was speaking to the men of the American 
Negro Academy that day, he was also reminding himself  of his voca-
tion. In reflecting on the vocation of the African American philosopher, 
Cornel West said it best: “If  Afro-American philosophers are to make a 
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substantive contribution to the struggle for Afro-American freedom, it is 
imperative that we critically reevaluate the grand achievements of the past 
philosophical figures in the West and avoid falling into their alluring ahis-
torical traps” (West 1983, 58). There is no question that Du Bois set the 
example for us in this regard.
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